We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to "bad" alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only.
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It turns out that the AS scheme is not invariant to "bad" alternatives, i.e., to alternatives that are not regarded highly by any player (to be made precise later). 2 We then consider another alternating-move scheme, namely the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. In the VAOV scheme, the two players take turns making offers until an alternative is accepted; any offer rejected by a player is taken out of consideration, and if no offer is accepted, the last remaining alternative is the outcome. We first characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome set of this scheme in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify a typical equilibrium.
In fact, our setup can also be considered as a finite bargaining setup. Bargaining theory has traditionally assumed a continuum of feasible outcomes. However, many real-life bargaining situations involve a finite number of alternatives, such as two managers choosing from among a few job candidates, or a husband and her wife choosing from among a few homes or automobiles. 3 Another characteristic of many real-life bargaining situations is that past concessions have significant relevance. Either past concessions have to be honored or new offers have to improve upon the past offers. 4 We will show involving a various health insurance possibilities (e.g., PPO and HMO options of a few insurance providers) -, and a few pension plan possibilities (e.g., TIAA-CREF or some state-funded plan), as well as, say, some dental plan possibilities. In many on-going relationships, it is conceivable that each party's preferences on such finitely many packages can be guessed rather accurately by the other party.
2 that such alternating-move schemes can provide additional insights concerning the above two schemes, as the next two paragraphs will indicate.
In the Enhancing Past Concessions scheme, two players take turns making offers until an alternative is accepted; any rejected alternative is taken out of consideration, and at any stage each Player i's offer must be preferred by his opponent Player j to Player i's previous offers. If only one unrejected alternative remains, it becomes the outcome. It turns out that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome set of this scheme coincides with that of the AS scheme.
In the Honoring Past Concessions scheme, two players take turns making offers and all offers are on the table until one is accepted; at any stage, a Player i can either (1) accept the last offer of Player j or (2) accept any of the previous offers made by Player j (which Player i had not accepted when they were offered) or (3) choose not to accept the current offer as well as any of the past offers. If only one rejected alternative remains, the player who is offered that alternative has to either accept it or accept one of the previous offers made by his opponent. It turns out that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome set of this scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. 
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE 'ALTERNATE STRIKE' SCHEME
Consider a finite set of alternatives, A. In the Alternate Strike scheme, the cardinality of A, #A, is seven. But our results will hold for any #A. We denote the two parties by L and M ("Labor" and "Management"). Players' preferences š L and š M over the alternatives in A are assumed to be complete, transitive and anti-symmetric (i.e., a player is indifferent between two alternatives a and b iff a = b). Given a set of alternatives A, and a profile (š L ,š M ), let (A,š L ,š M ) denote a
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To be sure, one of the most important aspects present in reality is the existence of uncertainty about the other player's rankings (especially when the two parties have not dealt with each other sufficiently many times in the past). Dealing with such uncertainty, however, makes this framework very complicated. To illustrate the extent of the complications, consider a problem with four alternatives. Suppose L knows his own rankings. Concerning M's rankings there can be twelve possibilities. Given that L assigns a probability distribution over these possibilities, not only M's ordinal preferences but also M's cardinal preferences will be relevant. But then L will also need to form a probability distribution over M's cardinal preferences over these twelve possibilities. As the number of alternatives grows, this complexity grows much faster.
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problem. (We will abbreviate (A,š L ,š M ) by using (š L , š M ) or A only when no confusion will arise from doing so.)
In the Alternate Strike scheme, the sequence of the moves is as follows where i,j = L,M, i … j: Player i first vetoes some a 0 A. Then Player j vetoes some b 0 A\{a}. Player i vetoes some a' 0 A\{a,b}. Player j vetoes some b' 0 A\{a,b,a'}.
Player i vetoes some a" 0 A\{a,b,a',b'}. Player j vetoes some b" 0 A\{a,b,a',b',a"}. Then the only remaining arbitrator c in A\{a,b,a',b',a",b"} is selected to arbitrate the dispute between L and M.
The FMCS provides the two parties with the resumés of the arbitrators (these resumés include information such as each arbitrator's training and prior decisions). It is reasonable to assume that, in many enduring relationships, 'each party knows its opponent's rankings over the arbitrators, but not necessarily the intensity of its opponent's preferences over any two arbitrators' and that 'these rankings are common knowledge between the parties but are not known to outsiders'. This also makes our framework tractable. 
Alternatively, each a in any problem (A,š L ,š M ) can be expressed in terms of players' rankings of a.
The alternatives in this example's problem (A,š L ,š M ) can be expressed as a = (0,3), b = (1,4), c = (2,2), d = (3,5), e = (4,1), f = (5,6), g = (6,0). The efficient alternatives are a, c, e, and g.
_____________________
Insert Figure 1 about here
The equilibrium outcome(s) of the AS scheme can be identified using an algorithm, the "Simultaneous Naive , suppose a and a' are alternatives in A such that a ™ i a' and a' ™ j a, i,j =1,2, i … j. Then a and a' are said to be adjacent alternatives iff there is no a 0 A* such that a ™ i a ™ i a' and a' ™ j a ™ j a. 
The AS scheme is a sequential game of perfect information. Therefore, here the notion of equilibrium is subgame perfection; a strategy profile s* is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if the strategy of each player is optimal at each decision node given the strategies of the other player. The first part of the next result fully characterizes the circumstances under which each F i A becomes the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. The second part provides a typical equilibrium. instead of L, observe that the outcome will still be a.
In the remarks below, we will focus on more specific features of this result. four. Observe that it does not matter which of d and e Player L will veto first and second; likewise, it does not matter which of a and b Player M will veto first and second. The equilibrium outcome will still be c. Since A is a symmetric set, c is the equilibrium outcome regardless of who moves first. This illustrates the presence of multiple equilibria even with a unique equilibrium outcome.
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Here is how 
is e which is dominated by both
6 Remark 2.4 provides an explanation as to what causes such an unsatisfactory result for the AS scheme.
THE 'VAOV' SCHEME
Now, we will analyze a scheme that, unlike the AS scheme, is invariant with respect to bad alternatives, namely the VAOV scheme (see Anbarci (1993) ). In the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, first, Player i offers some a 0 A. Player j can either accept a or veto it and offer some b 0 A\{a}. If Player j vetoes a and offers b, Player i can either accept b or veto it and offer some c 0 A\{a,b}, and so on. This procedure continues either until some alternative in A is offered and accepted or until only one unvetoed alternative remains in A, which is the outcome. Consider:
That is, any alternative a in A* i is efficient and Player i prefers fewer number of alternatives to it than Player j does. Note that ( i A is Player j's most preferred alternative in A* i .
Observe that, in Example 2.1, A* L = {a,c} and A* M = {c, e, g}; thus,
Suppose that #A* L $ 2 and #A* M $ 2. That is, for each player there are two or more efficient alternatives that he prefers at least as much as his opponent does. Then observe that the AS scheme is not very conducive to a compromise in that one of the player's most preferred alternative can be the outcome (see Example 2.1 for instance). Given the above condition, the VAOV scheme outcome, however, can never be any player's most preferred alternative (it simply follows from the definitions of ( M A and
Anbarci (1993)'s main concern is establishing the link between these outcomes and the Equal Area solution outcome as the number of alternatives tends to infinity (by using some structure to generate the equilibrium alternatives). Thus, for that paper's intent and purpose a result more precise than that is not needed.
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There are additional problems when more than two players are considered in all of the schemes analyzed in this paper. The first one is that the number of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes will grow with the number of players, n; i.e., there can be n possible equilibrium outcomes depending on who starts first. In addition, especially in the case of the VAOV scheme, there can several different rules concerning the vetoing of an alternative. That is, when an alternative is offered, it can be eliminated after the next player rejects it or it can eliminated after a certain number of players reject it (possibly all of the other players).
Theorem 1 in Anbarci (1993) showed that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome set of the VAOV scheme contains either ( L A or ( M A or both. Clearly, this result is not precise.
, it does not specify which of these two alternatives will become the equilibrium outcome under what circumstances. Thus, our next result is a significantly sharper version of Theorem 1 in Anbarci (1993) . 
In the remarks below, we will focus on more specific features of this result. if M offers c, L will reject it and the outcome will be b, and if M offers b, L will accept it, which will thus become the outcome. 
THE 'ENHANCING PAST CONCESSIONS' AND 'HONORING PAST CONCESSIONS' SCHEMES
First consider the Enhancing Past Concessions scheme. First Player i offers some a 0 A. Player j can either accept a or veto it and offer some b 0 A\{a}. If j vetoes a and offers b, Player i can either accept b or veto it and offer some c 0 A\{a,b}, and so on. During subsequent rounds, both players are further restricted in that they may not make an offer which, from the other player's point of view, is worse than an offer he has already vetoed. In other words, suppose that at some round Player i has offered some a' which consequently got vetoed by Player j; then at any later round Player i has the move, he is only allowed to offer an alternative a" such that a" ™ j a'. This procedure stops either when an alternative is accepted by one Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 ) considered bargaining problems between two players and introduced two approaches to modeling such problems: the strategic (non-cooperative) and axiomatic (cooperative) approaches. The attempt to combine them is known as the Nash program, which this paper will try to follow (at the finitely-many-alternatives setup as well as its relationship with Nash's cooperative bargaining setup). , a player has to offer a yet unoffered alternative; also a player can accept an alternative only from the ones that his opponent has offered up to that point). Then Player i can either accept an alternative from {b,d} or reject them, and so on. This procedure continues until either some alternative is offered and accepted or only one unoffered alternative a* remains. Suppose that Player i gets to offer a*, then Player j has to accept either a* or any alternative that Player i has offered before; the accepted alternative becomes the outcome. ) can be quite apart from each other for some finite A. This seems problematic since, depending on the situation, each player would like to be the first-or second-mover. Anbarci (1993) showed that if the alternatives in A are selected from S such that they are distributed uniformly over S in a particular way, then they converge as #A goes to infinity. Furthermore, they converge to the Equal Area solution "'s outcome "(S), which is the intersection point of MS and the straight line that goes through 0 and cuts S into two equal areas (see Anbarci (1993) and Anbarci and Bigelow (1994) ).
To generate some A from S, Anbarci (1993) first approximated S with a finite number of cells, and then selected one point from each cell. This approximation is created using a grid of rectangular cells that covers S completely. Let b i = max {x i * x 0 S}. Let n = 1,2,3,... denote the grid parameter such that the length of a cell is a 1 /n and its height is a 2 /n. Call any cell that contains some part of MS a boundary cell; observe that only boundary cells can contain some points outside S (it can easily be seen that Anbarci (1993)'s result is robust to making the cell length and height equal).
One alternative will be selected from each cell. To make use of Kuhn's backward induction theorem here, no player should be indifferent between two or more alternatives unless the other player is also indifferent between them. One can find many procedures to select alternatives to A from S such that Kuhn's theorem can be utilized. Anbarci (1993) selected alternatives by creating a slight bias against the less efficient cells; this is essentially identical to assuming that each Player i has lexicographic preferences such that he chooses a over a' if he prefers a over a' or if he is indifferent between a and a' and Player j prefers a over a' (one can see that Anbarci (1993) 's result would still hold even if the slight bias is created against more efficient cells, where players have somewhat negatively interdependent lexicographic preferences).
Specifically, there are n rows, R 1 ,...,R n , and n columns, C 1 ,...,C n . R 1 contains the origin as well as a 1 , and C 1 contains the origin and a 2. Let r k denote the boundary cell of R k , and let c k denote the boundary cell of C k , k = 1,2,...,n. Let Mr k denote Pareto frontier of r k , and let Mc k denote the Pareto frontier of c k . In each R k , find the point m(Mr k ), which bisects the arclength of Mr k , and connect m(Mr k ) to the southwest corner of R k through a straight line. Likewise, in each C k , find the point m(Mc k ), which bisects the arc-length of Mc k , and connect it to the southwest corner of C k through a straight line. The intersections of these row lines and column lines provide the set of alternatives A. Let P* denote this procedure (for more details of P*, see Anbarci (1993) and the figures therein).
Observe that any a in A selected through P* is either in MS or is strictly dominated by another alternative which is in MS. Also observe that, for each n and a given utility profile, #A will be invariant with respect to affine transformations 13 Uniform distribution of alternatives over S is used to highlight the importance of the Equal Area solution. In addition, comprehensiveness of S turns out to be important because, without comprehensiveness of S, the Equal Area solution outcome need not be efficient whereas the SPE outcomes of the AS and VAOV schemes are efficient. of players' utility functions. As n goes to infinity, the distance between any two adjacent alternatives becomes insignificant. Anbarci (1993) showed that, as n tends to infinity, ( L A and ( M A (which are adjacent efficient alternatives) tend to "(S).
It will turn that F L A and F M A too tend to "(S), as n tends to infinity. This seems surprising since for any arbitrary A (i.e., for any A that was not generated through P*), E(A) and '(A) could be significantly different. The key to the understanding of why E(A) and '(A) tend to "(S) is that, in some equilibrium in either scheme, players take turns in removal of alternatives from opposite sides of the line that connects the origin to "(S). This becomes identical to removing equal areas from opposite sides of that line. Since a finer grid (i.e., a grid with a higher n) approximates S better, the equilibrium outcomes of these schemes approximate "(S) better as n tends to infinity.
THEOREM 5: Suppose P* constructs A from S. As n 6 4, F L A and F M A converge to "(S).
REMARK 5.1: Here we extend the domain of non-cooperative foundations for the Equal Area solution towards a particular direction: when there is an alternating-move scheme with finitely many alternatives, which are distributed uniformly over the utility possibility set S, then the subgame-perfect outcome of that scheme converges to the Equal Area solution outcome. However, when the alternatives are not uniformly distributed over S, the solution outcomes of these schemes do not converge to the outcome of the Equal Area solution. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To summarize, this paper studies alternating-move bargaining situations and arbitration schemes in which only a finite set of feasible alternatives is present. Many real-life bargaining situations have this feature, but the literature has mainly dealt with the case of infinite choice sets. The two main contributions of this paper are, first, to study the of finite alternatingmove bargaining situations (arbitration schemes); and, second, to provide a general link between the finite-alternatives bargaining situations and the infinite-alternatives bargaining situations and consequently to provide robust non-cooperative foundations for the Equal Area solution. (1) We will use an inductive argument. Clearly, given any (B,š L ,š M ), the result is correct if B contains only two efficient alternatives, and there is no arbitrator selection problem when B is a singleton. We suppose that our claim has been established for B\a and we want to establish it for B. Suppose that L uses the following strategy: if
We will first show that when, without loss of generality, L moves at B, he will be able to make F L B the outcome against an opponent who follows a SPE strategy.
Suppose that L vetoes F M B . Then by Lemma A1.
Suppose that L vetoes w L Bt*-2 . Then by Lemma A1.1 ( 
. (ii) This is Lemma A1(i) in the Appendix of Anbarci (1993) .
(iii) It follows from the definitions of ( i A , P i (( i A ), and Q i .
We will also need the next lemma which follows from Lemma A2.1 and definitions (thus, its lengthy but straightforward proof will be omitted).
LEMMA A2.2. Consider two problems (B,š L ,š M ) and (B\a,š L ,š M 
.
(1) We will use an inductive argument. Clearly, given any (B,š L ,š M ), the result is correct if B contains only two efficient alternatives, and there is no arbitrator selection problem when B is a singleton. We suppose that our claim has been established for B\a and we want to establish it for B. Without loss of generality, let i = L and j = M. Suppose that L uses the following strategy: Offer some a 0 D 
